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Prepared for the Provost's Workshop on China, Iowa State University, 10
April 1998
Introduction
The increased energy and food needs of China have been the topic of
considerable dialog in both political and economic circles (Brown, 1994;
Drennen and Erickson, 1998), and the environmental consequences of these
increased needs have been evaluated (Smil, 1996b). The Chinese
population stands at 1.3 billion, with the likely prospect of adding an
additional 490 million people by 2030. The gross domestic product of China
has increased by 11% per year during the 1990's, which has led to a
substantial increase in purchasing power (Drennen and Erickson, 1998).
Meeting the needs of a rapidly advancing economy from a relatively primitive condition brings rapid increases in use of fertilizer, irrigation water, cement, fuels for electrical generators, and fuels for internal combustion engines. The resulting byproducts and environmental consequences of this rapid growth in a country lacking strong voices for the rights and well-being of individuals have the potential to jeopardize the long-term (in some cases, even short-term) viability of natural ecosystem services and ultimately the health and well-being of the Chinese people.
Previous essays have focused attention on who will supply the food to meet China's needs (Brown, 1994: Who will feed China?; Prosterman et al, 1996: Can China feed itself?) and who will supply the oil to meet China's needs (Drennen and Erickson, 1998: Who will fuel China?). A looming issue, regardless of who supplies these needs or even whether they are completely met, is the global environmental consequence of feeding and fueling a technologically advancing society the size of China.
I was a member of the May 1997 IITAP delegation led by the Provost that visited China under the Sustainable Development - Henan (SDH) project supported by the Office of the Provost and coordinated by Professor Bing-Lin Young. I present here some impressions from this visit and subsequent developments in the SDH project relating to environmental issues. An evaluation of the present status of energy and food consumption, together with reasonable projections of future growth in these areas, allows us to identify present and future environmental problems that ultimately will influence an ambitious and unconstrained trajectory for growth. Energy and food production are two areas of significant expertise at Iowa State University, so identification of impending problems and tracing these back to the goal of providing basic needs allows us to target areas of opportunity for research.
Growth in Use of Energy
China has large reserves of relatively high quality coal
(approximately 1.04% sulfur with about 10% ash content) although in some
areas the most readily available coal may have sulfur as high as 5% (Smil,
1996). Large electrical generating plants have been constructed and more
are being planned to power several large industrial areas that are leading
the way for Chinese development. Medium-technology pollution control
equipment is available and being installed in newly constructed plants.
However, these devices are not always functioning properly, and
provincial
regulatory agencies have little authority to enforce existing laws
governing their operation. Compounding the problem are inefficient
combustion processes in residential and small commercial applications which
lead to high levels of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter despite use of
relatively high quality fuel. Individual homes in
undeveloped regions burn charcoal
briquettes for heating and cooking.
Oil is less abundant in China, and recent efforts to intensify exploration have proved to be disappointing (Drennen and Erickson, 1998). As a result, China began importing oil in 1993 and within two years was purchasing 400 thousand barrels per day on international markets. This doubled to 800 thousand barrels per day in 1997 and is projected to reach 7-8 million barrels per day in 2015 and 13-15 million barrels per day by 2025. The US, by contrast, imports 8.4 million barrels per day.
Nuclear power contributes a small fraction to China's energy supply. China has substantial hydropower potential, much of which remains untapped. Solar and wind energy have not been exploited. Biomass has seen limited use for energy, although multiple (double and in some cases triple) cropping patterns, with resulting requirement to remove dead plant material for replanting, would seem to offer potential for future growth of biomass for fuel. Drennen and Erickson (1998) assert that, even under optimistic scenarios of foreign investment in hydro, nuclear, and biomass, the primary energy supply in China in 2025 will be fossil fuels (68% coal and 25% oil).
The environmental consequences of China's rapid increase in the use of fossil energy include increased concentrations of sulfur dioxide gas (and subsequently sulfate particles), which, together with oxides of nitrogen provide the ingredients for acid rain. The relatively inefficient combustion produced in some industrial applications and in all coal briquette-burning stoves in private homes produces carbon monoxide and unburned hydrocarbons that create the growing smog problem in most major cities. And, of course, all use of fossil fuel leads to the release of fossil carbon into the atmosphere as part of the increase in greenhouse gas loading.
Foell et al (1995) have evaluated impacts on ecosystems in Asia resulting from sulfur dioxide emissions from energy use. With a "business as usual" approach to energy growth and emissions control in Asia, sulfur deposition will rise to 2-5 g m2 y-1 by 2020. Peak depositions in industrial areas of China are projected to be as high as 27 g m2 y-1, approximately twice the worst cases experienced in Central and Eastern Europe. Impacts on ecosystems are evaluated by comparison against the critical load (CL), defined as the highest load that will not cause chemical changes leading to long-term harmful effects in the most sensitive ecological systems (Kuylenstierna and Chadwick, 1989). Calculations of Foell et al (1995) revealed that CL of sulfur will be exceeded over large regions, including many productive agricultural regions, by 5-10 g m2 y-1. By use of the RAINS software (Kamari et al, 1989) we produced a plot of percentage of areas in each 1o x 1o grid box that exceeds the CL for Asia for the year 2020 if no sulfur control strategies are employed (Figure 1). Figure 2 gives the sulfur exceedance amount for each region identified in Figure 1 as exceeding the CL. The urgency of the problem is confirmed by the fact that the pH of rainfall in Liuzhou in Guangzi Province has been reported to be 3.06, and Guiyang in Guizhou Province has reported rainfall of pH 3.15 (Smil, 1996b). (Seven is neutral and less than 7 is acidic.) For comparison, this rainfall is more acidic than a tomato (4.0 - 4.4) or a dill pickle (3.2 - 3.6) and approaches the acidity of pure vinegar (2.4 - 3.4).
Impacts of tropospheric ozone and other air pollutants associated with both stationary and mobile energy consumption are expected to produce additional strain on ecosystems.
Growth and Change in
Food Demands
The average Chinese farm is about the size of an American football
field. On one hand this seems appropriate, given the abundance of
labor,
lack of capital, and already high unemployment in rural China. On the
other hand, there is debate over the position of Prosterman et al (1996)
who contend the average Chinese farm family is relatively well off. In our
May 1997 visit with Professor Guang Zhou, then President of the Chinese
Academy of Science and now Vice President of the Peoples Congress, we were
urged to consider the plight of the rural Chinese people, many of whom by
most accounts are struggling with near-poverty living conditions.
Rice and wheat are two major grains grown in China which historically have been staples in the Chinese diet. Yields of rice have increased by 100 kg ha-1y-1 in the past 30 years, although the growth in yields has slowed to 30 kg ha-1y-1 since 1984. Similarly, yields of wheat increased by an average of 83 kg ha-1y-1 from 1960 to 1993, but only 50 kg ha-1y-1 from 1984 to 1993.
Wang and Zhao (1995), who use global climate models to project changes in vegetation that would accompany global warming by 2050, estimate that areas available for triple cropping would increase by 22%, double cropping would be unchanged, and area suitable for only single cropping would be reduced by 23%. They conclude that agricultural production could increase in 2050 in northeast China due to more favorable temperatures and double cropping replacing single cropping patterns. Eastern China, however, in spite of higher precipitation, would experience higher evaporative losses due to higher temperature. They assert that lack of water availability will curtail yield increases that might accompany a generally more favorable climate. The combination of higher evaporative demand coupled with triple cropping in regions now hosting only two crops annually surely will put significant demands on irrigation water supplies.
The several global climate model simulations that I have scanned suggest a warmer and drier future for China. Copious sulfur emissions will have a short-term cooling effect on the climate but over the long term, CO2-driven warming likely will prevail. Some models suggest less-than-present spring and early summer rainfall, which could jeopardize the required natural rain and irrigation-water supplies for a more intensified agricultural production system. There is a clear need for higher resolution information on China's future climate. Our IITAP Project to Intercompare Regional Climate Simulations (Takle, 1995), funded by the US Electric Power Research Institute is developing the capacity to provide information on climate change that is critically needed for agricultural and water-resource planners. We have initiated discussions with scientists from the Chinese National Climatic Center about deploying the latest regional models to simulate China's future climate.
Of possibly more severe consequence than long-term averages is the potential for year-to-year fluctuations, particularly in agricultural production, due to extreme meteorological events. This became quite apparent in 1991 when floods in Anhui and Sichuan caused possibly tens of billions of RMB damage, affected 80% of the people in Anhui, marooned 9 million people and destroyed 1.5 million homes (Smil, 1996b). Our climate models also could be used to study future occurrences of such events.
Farmland is being lost in China due to urbanization and other non-crop use from 1986-93 at a rate of about 500,000 ha y-1, which is an area about 4 times the size of Story County per year. Most of China's agriculture relies on irrigation, and this will likely increase with increases in multiple cropping and use of more marginal lands. However, Wang (1989) reported that 20% of the 878 major rivers in China already are polluted to the point that the water is unsuitable even for irrigation. These and other constrains will put limitations of growth of food production in China.
Table 1 gives a comparison between China and the US in per-capita use of grain and consumption of livestock products. Americans account for nearly 3 times the grain consumption of the Chinese. Although average Chinese consumption of pork nearly matches US levels, consumption of poultry, milk, eggs, and especially beef, lag far behind US amounts. Other Asian countries having moved up the development path have dramatically increased consumption of livestock products, principally beef. Table 2 gives an estimate of grain requirements for various animal products. Beef stands out as a particularly grain-intensive means of producing food for human consumption. Since 1980, consumption in all categories of Table 1 has increased in China (Smil, 1996a). Brown (1994) contends this raises a red flag to international food markets.
To put this issue into perspective, I have calculated the potential impact of increased beef consumption in China (Takle, 1998). Supplying every Chinese citizen one MacDonald's Quarter Pounder per week would require half of the US corn crop and a sewage treatment plant for cattle wastes 4.5 times the entire aggregate US human wastewater treatment capacity (if we treated animal wastes like human wastes). If they were all raised in Iowa, we would have over half a million cattle per county.
There are significant opportunities for improving Chinese agriculture to enhance its internal food-producing capacity. These include:
The Environmental Challenge
The strains of meeting the energy and food requirements of an
advancing Chinese economy will put heavy demands on Chinese internal supply
sources. And if these needs are not met internally, international markets
will experience a significant impact. There are contentions that many
areas of the world, including the US, already are engaging in
long-term-unsustainable agricultural practices in an effort to meet current
needs. It is therefore a global challenge to assist China to increase its
agricultural and energy-production efficiency to protect sustainability
both in China in other parts of the world.
Smil estimates (Table 3) that pollution (air, water, and solid waste) cost the Chinese 30 to 44 billion RMB ($1 = 8.3 RMB) in 1990. Technologies to dramatically reduce these costs are readily available but presumably at costs judged not economically feasible by the Chinese government. Smil further estimates China's environmental degradation for 1990 (Table 4) to range from 66 to 125 billion RMB, much of which directly or indirectly relates to food production.
Smil (1996b) concludes that "...it is extremely unlikely that the economic cost of China's environmental pollution and ecosystemic degradation was less than 5% of the country's GDP in 1990. A range of 6-8 % is the most likely conservative estimate..." He goes on to say that if some of the more elusive factors not considered in his analysis were factored in, the rate could be as high as 15%. These numbers would seem to justify substantial investment by the Chinese government beyond the 0.56 to 0.81% presently allocated. There are recent indications (Prof. Bing-Lin Young, personal communication) that the present restructuring of the Chinese government will bring more emphasis on environmental issues.
China's transformation to an industrialized economy will require widespread implementation of advanced technologies relating to energy and food production. This task represents a sobering task, as represented by the expression of a downtown Beijing lion.
Tables
Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
FAO Production Yearbook 1990 (Rome, 1991)
Adapted from Brown, Lester. R., 1994: Who will feed China? World Watch. September/October, 10-19.
Table 3. Estimated environmental pollution costs in China in 1990 (Smil, 1996)
Category Minimum cost Maximum cost (RMB in millions) (RMB in millions) Air pollution 11,000 19,200 Water pollution 9,700 14,000 Solid waste disposal 9,000 10,500 TOTAL 29,700 43,700
Table 4. Estimated environmental degradation costs in China in 1990 (Smil, 1996)
Category Minimum cost Maximum cost (RMB in millions) (RMB in millions) Loss of farmland 1,600 4,100 Soil erosion 11,000 26,400 Farmland degradation 4,200 8,000 Land reclamation after mining 100 200 Degradation of grasslands 3,700 5,400 Loss of wetlands 200 500 Forest mismanagement 39,900 71,500 Water shortages 5,000 8,700 TOTAL 65,700 124,800